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ABSTRACT
BANKRUPTCY RISK AND THE PERFORMANCE OF MARKET-BASED
POLLUTION CONTROL POLICIES
SEPTEMBER 2008
WEI ZHANG, B.A., NANKAI UNIVERSITY, CHINA
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor John K. Stranlund

We study the impacts of bankruptcy risk on the performance of
market-based pollution control policies. In Chapter one, we concentrate on emissions
trading markets. We find that firms that risk bankruptcy demand more permits than if
they were financially secure. Thus, bankruptcy risk in a competitive market for
tradable permits causes an inefficient distribution of these permits among firms.
Moreover, the equilibrium distribution of permits is dependent on the initial allocation
of permits. Thus, the main reasons for implementing emissions trading markets do not
hold when some firms are financially insecure. In fact, the inefficiency that is
associated with bankruptcy risk is worsened if financially insecure firms are given a
smaller share of the initial allocation of permits.
In chapter two, we investigate the influences of bankruptcy risk on
imperfectly enforced emissions taxes. Under favorable, but not unrealistic conditions,

vi

an imperfectly enforced emissions tax produces an efficient allocation of individual
emissions control; the aggregate level of control is the same whether enforcement of a
tax is sufficient to induce the full compliance of firms or not, and differences in
individual violations are independent of firm-level differences. All of these desirable
characteristics disappear when some firms under an emissions tax risk
bankruptcy—the allocation of emissions control is inefficient, imperfect enforcement
causes higher aggregate emissions, and financially insecure firms choose higher
violations.
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CHAPTER 1
BANKRUPTCY RISK AND EMISSIONS TRADING MARKETS
1.1 Introduction
The fundamental value of competitive emissions trading markets, as well as
other regulatory attempts to restrict behavior by allocating tradable property rights, is
that they are predicted to produce distributions of individual emissions control
decisions that minimize the aggregate abatement costs of reaching a predetermined
environmental quality target. Moreover, the equilibrium distribution of emissions
control is independent of the initial allocation of emissions permits, giving regulators
the freedom to use the initial allocation of permits to pursue other objectives, such as
those arising from equity concerns or the exercise of political power, without
upsetting the efficiency property of emissions trading (Montgomery 1972).
Of course, the performance of emissions trading schemes depends critically
on the assumption of competitive permit trading. Hahn (1984) was the first to
demonstrate that market power in an emissions trading scheme would generally lead
to an inefficient distribution of emissions control responsibilities. Under the
assumption that all firms expect one are price takers, the total expenditure on
abatement would exceed the cost-minimizing solution unless the firm with market
power could receive an amount of permits equal to the number that it chooses to hold
in equilibrium. If inefficiency is measured by the extent to which abatement costs
exceed the minimum required to achieve a fixed target, it rises as the initial allocation
of permits to the firm with market power increases above or decreases below the
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equilibrium amount it holds. That is, the initial allocation of permits matters, with
regard not only to equity considerations but also to cost.1
Stavins (1995) examined the impact of transaction costs on tradable permit
systems. Assuming that transaction costs are a function of the size of trades, it is
shown that in the presence of transaction costs total expenditure on pollution control,
even excluding transaction costs would exceed the cost-minimizing solution if the
initial allocation deviates from what would be the equilibrium distribution in the
absence of transaction costs. If marginal transaction costs are constant, the initial
allocation of permits has no effect on the equilibrium distribution of control
responsibilities and aggregate abatement costs. However, the presence of variable
marginal transaction costs would make the equilibrium distribution of control levels
depend on the initial allocation of permits. Thus, in the presence of transaction costs
the initial distribution of permits can matter in terms of efficiency, not only in terms of
equity.2
The motivation of this chapter is to build the connection between firms’
financial status and emissions trading markets via the limited liability effect. As
market power and transaction costs, we suspect that bankruptcy risk is another source
of allocation inefficiency. With the continuing application of cap-and-trade into new
settings, it is virtually certain that regulators will confront, or have already confronted,
1

The literature on market power in emissions trading programs is quite extensive. See
Tietenberg (2006) for a thorough review of this literature.
2
A number of authors have considered how transaction costs have affected the performance
of actual trading programs. Cason and Gangadharan (2003) provide an excellent review of
this literature. The primary motivation of their paper is to use laboratory markets to test the
impacts of transaction costs on transferable permit markets. Their results generally support the
conclusions of Stavins (1995).
2

situations involving financially distressed polluters. Thus, knowledge of how the
financial health of regulated firms can impact the performance of emissions trading
schemes is an important consideration in the design and evaluation of these policies.
We are certainly not the first to demonstrate that the financial health of firms
can impact the performance of markets. Brander and Lewis (1986) first examined the
connection between firms’ financial structure and output market via the limited
liability effect—firms controlled by shareholders have an incentive to pursue output
strategies that raise returns in good states and lower returns in bad states. A Cournot
duopolists model was used in their work, in which the financial structure of the two
firms are first decided and then output levels are selected taking their financial
composition as given. Assuming random profits and symmetry between the two firms,
the equilibrium output of a firm rises with its own debt level and associated
bankruptcy risk, but decreases with its rival’s debt level.
We are also not the first to demonstrate that bankruptcy risk may impact
regulatory designs, including environmental and natural resource policies. Spiegel and
Spulber (1994) investigate the interactions between the investment and financial
decisions of regulated firms and the pricing choices of regulators. The regulatory
process was modeled as a three-stage game in which a regulated firm chooses capital
structure first, then the market value of the firm’s debt and equity are established in a
competitive capital market and finally the regulator sets the firm’s price. They found
that in equilibrium the regulated firm issues a positive amount of debt and hence its
risk of bankruptcy is positive. The optimal regulated price increases in the firm’s debt
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obligation and decreases in the firm’s investment level.
Damania (2000) explores the link between pollution taxes and the financial
and output decisions of firms in an oligopolistic industry facing demand uncertainty.
Following a model analogous to Brander and Lewis (1986), it is shown that pollution
taxes may induce firms to alter their financial structure, which in turn influences both
output market and effectiveness of pollution taxes. Since an emissions tax on a
leveraged firm will not only increase production costs, but also affects the firm’s
ability to meet its debt obligations, there are circumstances under which highly
leveraged firms may respond to pollution taxes by actually increasing their output. In
a more recent work, Damania and Bulte (2006) relate the harvest decisions of firms in
a fishery to the financial structure of the industry and regulatory control. Contrary to
predictions about the decision of firms in the absence of bankruptcy risk, they
demonstrate that the risk of bankruptcy may cause firms to increase their harvests and
violations of harvest quotas if noncompliance penalties are increased or harvest quotas
are reduced.
To our knowledge our work is the first to examine how the risk of bankruptcy
affects the performance of tradable property rights regulations. We demonstrate that
firms under an emissions trading scheme that face a positive risk of bankruptcy will
demand more emissions permits than they would if they did not risk bankruptcy.
Consequently, a significant number of financially distressed firms will cause the
equilibrium distribution of emission control responsibilities to differ from the
distribution that minimizes aggregate abatement costs. Moreover, the equilibrium

4

distribution of control and the loss induced by financially distressed firms will depend
on the initial distribution of permits—a larger initial allocation of emissions permits to
distressed firms will reduce their risk of bankruptcy. Thus, there are welfare
consequences of the initial distribution of permits that are not present when emissions
markets do not include financially distressed firms. In fact, distributing a greater
number of permits to distressed firms reduces the excess aggregate costs of emissions
control that is due to bankruptcy risk.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In the next section we lay out
a simple model of a value-maximizing firm that may risk insolvency. In section 3 we
investigate the effect of financial distress on a firm’s demand for emissions permits
and demonstrate that bankruptcy risk upsets the efficiency property that is associated
with competitive emissions trading. In section 4 we demonstrate how bankruptcy risk
affects emissions markets, particularly the efficiency consequences of the initial
distribution of emissions permits. We conclude in section 5 with a discussion of the
policy implications of this work.
1.2 A Model of a Value-maximizing Firm under Emissions Trading
In this section we present a model of a firm seeking to maximize its expected
value while operating under an emissions trading scheme. Given optimal output and
input choices, the firm’s profit is π (e)(1 + z ) excluding permit payments. e is the
firm’s emissions and z is a continuous random variable that is independently (but
not necessarily identically) distributed in the population of regulated firms. This
random variable reflects the effects of uncertainty on the firm’s profit, such as the
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effects of random shifts in the demand for the firm’s output or random changes in
factor prices. The probability density function of z is g ( z ) with support [ z , z ] .
The expectation of z is zero so the firm’s expected profit is simply π (e) . The value
of z is realized after all production and permit market decisions have been made.
We assume that the firm’s expected profit, π (e) , is strictly concave in the
firm’s emissions. In the absence of inducement to control its emissions, the firm’s
emissions are determined by π ′(e) = 0 , the solution to which is denoted e m . It will
become obvious in the next section (particularly footnote 3) that the way we have
modeled the uncertainty the firm faces implies that it chooses e m when it is not
regulated whether it risks bankruptcy or not. The implementation of an emissions
trading scheme generates a price for emissions that motivates the firm to reduce its
emissions below e m . As is standard, we define the firm’s abatement costs as the
difference between its expected profit when it does not control emissions and its
expected profit when it reduces emissions. That is, for e ∈ [0, em ] , the firm’s
abatement costs are c(e) = π (em ) − π (e) . Moreover, the firm’s marginal abatement
cost function is −c′(e) = π ′(e) . We assume that π (e) > 0 for e ∈ [0, e m ] ; that is, the
firm’s expected profit is strictly greater than zero in the relevant range of emissions.
The firm receives an initial endowment of permits l . Each permit gives the
firm the right to release one unit of emissions. Assume that the enforcement of the
emissions trading program is sufficient to induce full compliance, so that the firm
holds the same number of emissions permits as its emissions. The market for
emissions permits is perfectly competitive so that trade establishes a constant price
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per permit p . The firm’s expenditure or revenue from permit transactions is
p (e − l ) .

Here, we focus on one compliance period in which the firm’s financial
structure is fixed and fully captured by its equity A and its debt obligation D .
Given a realization of z , the value of the firm is
v (e, z ) = π (e)(1 + z ) − p (e − l ) − D + A .

[1.1]

If v(e, z ) turns out to be negative, the firm’s losses exceed its equity. It then declares
bankruptcy and uses its equity to partially pay off its creditors. Apart from losing its
equity, there are no other costs of declaring bankruptcy. If v(e, z ) turns out to be
greater than zero, the firm remains solvent. Note that the firm is willing to tolerate an
operating loss if the loss does not exceed its equity.
Define a critical breakeven state, ẑ , in which the firm’s equity is just
sufficient for the firm to avoid bankruptcy:
zˆ = z | v(e, zˆ ) = π (e)(1 + zˆ ) − p (e − l ) − D + A = 0 .

[1.2]

Solving for ẑ yields
zˆ =

p (e − l ) + D − A
−1.
π (e)

[1.3]

If the realized value of z is greater than ẑ , the firm remains solvent; but it is
insolvent if the realized value of z is less than ẑ . The probability that the firm
avoids bankruptcy is the probability that z ≥ zˆ ; that is,

∫

z

zˆ

g ( z )dz . Clearly, the

probability of bankruptcy increases with ẑ . Note that if ẑ ≤ z , the firm is financial
secure in the sense that it does not risk bankruptcy. At the other end of the range of z ,
if ẑ ≥ z , the firm will definitely be insolvent. Obviously, in this case the firm will not
7

even bother to begin production. However, in the more interesting cases in which
zˆ ∈ ( z , z ) , the probabilities that the firm will be solvent or insolvent are both strictly

positive.
From [1.3], note that the first derivatives of ẑ are:
zˆ A =

−1
−p
1
< 0 , zˆl =
< 0 , zˆD =
> 0,
π ( e)
π (e)
π (e)

zˆ p =

(e − l )
p − π ′(e)(1 + zˆ )
, and zˆe =
.
π ( e)
π (e)

[1.4]

(Throughout, derivatives are indicated by subscripts in the usual fashion). Recalling
that π (e) is greater than zero. For zˆ ∈ ( z , z ) , an increase in the firm’s equity reduces
the breakeven value of z and the probability that it will be forced to declare
bankruptcy. Similarly, since the initial allocation of permits is just another asset, an
increase in the firm’s initial allocation of permits reduces ẑ and the probability that
it will be insolvent. Of course, an increase in the firm’s debt payment, D , increases

ẑ and the probability the firm will be insolvent. The effect of a change in the price of
permits on the probability of insolvency depends on whether the firm is a net buyer or
net seller of permits. If the firm sells permits, an increase in the price of permits
increases the value of the firm and reduces its bankruptcy risk. If the firm buys
permits, a price increase raises the likelihood that the firm will be insolvent. Finally,
the effect of the firm’s level of emissions on the likelihood of insolvency depends on
the relationship between the permit price and the firm’s marginal profit evaluated at

ẑ . In general, the sign of zˆe is indeterminate, but it is easy to show that it is positive
when the firm chooses its emissions optimally.
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The manager of the firm is risk neutral and chooses the firm’s emissions to
maximize the expected value of the firm. Denote the expectation of v(e, z ) as
V (e, z ) 3. Therefore,
zˆ

z

z

zˆ

V (e, z ) = ∫ (− A) g ( z )dz + ∫ [π (e)(1 + z ) − p(e − l ) − D ]g ( z )dz . [1.5]
Throughout we assume that V (e, z ) is strictly concave in its emissions for every
feasible value of z , and that the firm optimally chooses a positive level of emissions.
Note that the firm only considers states of insolvency because it risks losing its equity.
The limited liability has important consequences for the firm’s optimal choice of
emissions. We will investigate this in the next section.
1.3 Bankruptcy Risk and a Firm’s Demand for Emissions Permits
In the standard demonstration of the ability of a competitive emissions
market to distribute individual emissions efficiently, firms maximize profit without
fearing the possibility of bankruptcy. In our model, if a firm is financially secure,
ẑ ≤ z and [1.5] reduces to π (e) − p (e − l ) − D . Clearly, the firm takes its equity into

account when making decisions only when it risks losing it. When there is no such
risk, the firm chooses its emissions so that p = π ′(e) , which is the familiar condition
that a firm chooses its permit demand and emissions to equate its marginal abatement
cost to the going permit price. (Recall that π ′(e) = −c′(e) ). If no firm under an
emissions trading program faces bankruptcy, their emissions choices equate their
marginal abatement costs, which forms the set of necessary conditions for minimizing

3

We could model the expected value of the firm in another way,
V ( e , z ) = ∫ zˆ 0 g ( z ) dz + ∫ z [π ( e )(1+ z ) − p ( e − l ) − D + A]g ( z ) dz . There is no material difference between the two forms.
zˆ
z

[1.5] represents the flow of shareholder’s benefits, but this one stands for the stock of it.
9

the aggregate abatement costs of holding aggregate emissions to some exogenous
level. Moreover, it is obvious that the firm’s choice of emissions does not depend on
the initial permit allocations.
Matters are very different if some firms under an emissions trading program
risk bankruptcy. Given our assumptions that [1.5] is strictly concave in the firm’s
emissions and that the firm chooses positive emissions, the following first order
condition is both necessary and sufficient to uniquely determine its optimal choice of
z

emissions: Ve = ∫ [π ′(e)(1 + z ) − p]g ( z )dz − zˆe g ( zˆ )[π (e)(1 + zˆ ) − p(e − l ) − D + A] = 0 .
zˆ

Using the definition of ẑ provided by [1.2], the first order condition simplifies to
z

Ve = ∫ [π ′(e)(1 + z ) − p]g ( z )dz = 0 .
zˆ

[1.6]

Rearranging this equation gives us
p = π ′(e)[1 + E ( z | z > zˆ )] ,

[1.7]

where
z

E ( z | z > zˆ ) = ∫ zg ( z )dz
z垐

z

∫z g ( z)dz

[1.8]

is the expectation of z (E is the expectation operator) when its distribution is
truncated on the left at ẑ .4 Therefore, E ( z | z > zˆ ) is the expectation of z
conditional on the firm being solvent.5 See Appendix for proof. In fact, the right hand
side of [1.7] is the firm’s expected marginal profit over states in which it avoids
bankruptcy. Why does the firm ignore states in which it is bankrupt when choosing
4

A financially distressed firm’s choice of emissions in an unregulated setting is determined
from [1.7] by setting p = 0 . Doing so yields e m , the solution to π ′(e) = 0 . This is the
same unregulated level of emissions that the firm would choose if it did not risk bankruptcy.
5
One should be careful to not interpret p = π ′(e)[1 + E ( z | z > zˆ)] as the inverse permit
demand function for a financially distressed firm, because the permit price p appears in
E ( z | z > zˆ ) .
10

emissions? It is because its loss in bankrupt states is its constant level of equity, A ,
which does not depend on its choice of emissions. The fixed limit on the firm’s
bankruptcy liability causes it to choose its emissions to optimize over only the states
in which it will be solvent. This is analogous to the limited liability effect Brander and
Lewis (1986) referred to.
The presence of E ( z | z > zˆ ) in [1.7] is an adjustment to the firm’s choice of
emissions that reflects its risk of bankruptcy. When ẑ ≤ z , the probability of
bankruptcy is zero, [1.8] reduces to E ( z ) = 0 because the distribution of z is no
longer truncated, and [1.7] reduces to p = π ′(e) . Moreover, since
z

∫zˆ

z

zg ( z )dz > ∫ zg ( z )dz = 0 as zˆ ∈ ( z , z ) , E ( z | z > zˆ ) is strictly positive when the
z

firm risks bankruptcy. This implies that a financially distressed firm will choose its
emissions so that p > π ′(e) , which implies further that, given the permit price, its
emissions will be higher than if it did not risk bankruptcy.
The fact that a financially insecure firm does not equate its marginal
abatement costs to the going price of permits leads directly to one of our main results
about the impact of financial insecurity on the performance of competitive emissions
trading. That is, an emissions trading program that contains financially insecure firms
will fail to distribute emissions control in the way that minimizes aggregate abatement
costs. Accomplishing this objective requires that all firms’ emissions choices equate
their individual marginal abatement costs. However, firms that risk bankruptcy choose
levels of emissions so that their marginal abatement costs are lower than the going
permit price, while those firms that do not risk bankruptcy choose their emissions to
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equate their marginal abatement costs to the permit price. Moreover, the marginal
abatement costs among financially distressed firms will differ, because the values of

ẑ will likely vary across these firms and the densities g ( z ) may vary as well. Since
the permit market will not equate the firms’ marginal abatement costs, aggregate
abatement costs will not be minimized. Thus, the main reason for implementing
emissions trading programs does not hold in situations involving firms that risk
bankruptcy.
Moreover, the distribution of emissions control will not be independent of the
initial allocation of permits, because financially distressed firms’ demands for permits
will depend on their permit allocations. To see why, obtain the comparative static,

∂e ∂l = − Vel Vee , in the usual manner. Since Vee < 0 by assumption, the sign of ∂e ∂l
is the same as the sign of Vel . Differentiate [1.6] with respect to l and substitute zˆl
from [1.4] into the result to obtain Vel = ( p π (e) )(π '(e)(1 + zˆ) − p ) g ( ẑ ) . To sign this,
first note that z垐< E ( z | z > z ) ; that is, ẑ is less than the expectation of z when its
distribution is truncated at ẑ . Furthermore, since π ′(e)[1 + E ( z | z > zˆ )] − p = 0
from [1.6], z垐< E ( z | z > z ) implies π ' (e)(1 + zˆ ) − p < 0 . Therefore, Vel < 0 and
∂e ∂l < 0 , which reveals that a financially distressed firm’s emissions are decreasing

in its initial allocation of permits. Intuitively, an increase in a firm’s initial allocation
of permits increases the value of the firm, all else equal. Since this then reduces the
risk of bankruptcy of a financially distressed firm, it will choose its emissions so that
the gap between the permit price and π ′(e) is reduced. In turn this implies lower
emissions for a given permit price. Thus, a higher allocation of permits to a
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financially distressed firm reduces its bankruptcy risk and causes it to choose lower
emissions.
To complete this section, let us determine the effect of changes in permit
price on a financially distressed firm’s optimal emissions. As above, the comparative
static ∂e ∂p = − Vep Vee has the same sign as Vep . From [1.6] and zˆ p from [1.4]
z

obtain Vep = − ∫ g ( z )dz −
zˆ

e−l
[π ′(e)(1 + zˆ ) − p ]g ( zˆ ) .
π (e )

Note that the first term of Vep is negative. However, recall from above that

π ' (e)(1 + zˆ ) − p < 0 so the sign of the second term of Vep depends on whether the
firm is a net buyer or seller of permits. If the firm sells permits (e < l ) , Vep and
∂e ∂p are negative. Thus, if a financially distressed firm sells permits its demand for

permits is downward sloping in permit price. However, if the firm buys permits
(e > l ) , the sign of Vep is indeterminate because its second term is positive. Thus, it

is possible that the permit demand function for a firm that simultaneously risks
bankruptcy and optimally chooses to buy permits may be upward sloping. As odd as
this result appears, it is consistent with a result of Damania and Bulte (2005) who
found that an increase in regulatory stringency to induce more conservative harvests
in a fishery can lead to less conservative choices by firms that risk bankruptcy.
Increased regulatory stringency in our model means that the aggregate cap on
emissions is reduced and fewer permits are issued. Under most circumstances we
would expect this to increase the price of permits and lead all firms to reduce their
emissions. However, a financially distressed firm that is a net buyer of permits may
react to the reduced cap on aggregate emissions and increased permit price by
13

increasing its emissions.
1.4 The Initial Allocation of Permits and the Market Effects of Bankruptcy Risk

In this section we examine the market effects of bankruptcy risk and limited
liability, particularly the role that the initial allocation of permits plays in determining
market outcomes and the allocative efficiency of competitive emissions trading. We
focus on the initial permit allocation for two reasons. First, increasing the initial
supply of permits to financially distressed firms reduces their risk of bankruptcy,
everything else equal. Therefore, we can trace out the effects of varying bankruptcy
risk on permit markets by varying the initial allocation of permits. Second, in contrast
to the conventional wisdom that the initial permit allocation does not affect the
performance of competitive emissions trading, we have just demonstrated that the
initial permit allocation will certainly impact emissions markets when some firms risk
bankruptcy. Hence, the initial allocation has efficiency consequences that cannot be
ignored.
In this section we simplify the analysis by assuming that an emissions trading
program contains just two types of firms, 1 and 2. Type 1 firms do not risk bankruptcy
while type 2 firms do. There are ni identical firms of type i = 1, 2. Let li , ei and

π i denote the initial allocation of permits, emissions, and expected profit function for
each type i firm. The emissions of a type 1 firm is e1 ( p ) , the implicit solution to
p = π 1′(e1 ) , which of course is independent of their initial allocation of permits

because they do not risk bankruptcy. It is straightforward to show that e1 ( p ) is
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monotonically decreasing in p .6 The emissions choice of a type 2 firm is e2 ( p, l2 ) ,
the characteristics of which we explored in the previous section.
With an aggregate supply of permits equal to L , the permit market clears if
and only if n1e1 ( p ) + n2 e2 ( p, l2 ) = L , which implicitly defines the equilibrium price of
permits as a function of the total supply of permits and the allocation to the financially
distressed firms; that is, p( L, l2 ) . Differentiate the identity

n1e1 ( p( L, l2 )) + n2e2 ( p( L, l2 ), l2 ) ≡ L with respect to l2 and rearrange the result to
obtain the effect of the allocation of permits to the firms that risk bankruptcy on the
equilibrium permit price.
− n2 ∂e2 / ∂l2
∂p
.
=
∂l2 n1 ( de1 dp ) + n2 ( de2 dp )

[1.9]

The numerator of the right hand side of [1.9] is positive because, as we showed in the
last section ∂e2 / ∂l2 < 0 . The denominator of the right hand side of [1.9] is the slope
of the aggregate demand function for emissions permits. In general the impact of
permit price on the aggregate demand function is indeterminate because of the
possibility that financial insecure firms’ permit demands increase in the permit price.
For most of the rest of analysis we assume that the aggregate demand function for
permits is decreasing in the permit price, because we believe this is the most likely
case in real applications. We will, however, briefly note the consequences of an
upward sloping aggregate demand function at the end of this section. Under the
assumption that the denominator of [1.9] is negative, ∂p ∂l2 < 0 . This indicates that

6

From p − π 1′(e1 ) = 0 obtain de1 dp = 1 π 1′′(e1 ) < 0 . The sign follows from the strict

concavity of π 1 (e1 ) .
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the equilibrium permit price is increasing as the allocation of permits to financially
distressed firms is reduced. Consequently, higher bankruptcy risk in an emissions
trading market is likely to produce a higher permit price.
In turn, the higher permit price changes the emissions of financially secure
and insecure firms in opposite directions. Since de1 dp < 0 , reducing the initial
allocation of permits to the financially insecure firms decreases the emissions of the
financially secure firms through the increase in the permit price. Holding aggregate
emissions to L , then, requires that the equilibrium response of the insecure firms to a
decrease in their initial allocation of permits is that they increase their emissions. To
demonstrate this formally, note that

( ∂e2

∂p )( ∂p ∂l2 ) + ∂e2 / ∂l2 is the equilibrium

emissions response of a financially distressed firm to a change in the initial permit
allocation to these firms. While we have shown that the direct effect, ∂e2 / ∂l2 , is less
than zero, the sign of the indirect effect,

( ∂e2

∂p )( ∂p ∂l2 ) , is ambiguous because the

sign of ∂e2 ∂p is ambiguous. However, the total effect is negative. To see this
substitute [1.9] into

( ∂e2

( ∂e2

∂p )( ∂p ∂l2 ) + ∂e2 / ∂l2 to obtain

∂p )( ∂p ∂l2 ) + ∂e2 / ∂l2 =

n2 ( de1 dp )( ∂e2 / ∂l2 )
< 0 . [1.10]
n1 ( de1 dp ) + n2 ( de2 dp )

Under the assumption that the aggregate demand for permits is downward sloping, the
sign of [1.10] is negative because de1 dp < 0 and ∂e2 / ∂l2 < 0 . Therefore, increased
bankruptcy risk can increase the number of permits demanded by financially insecure
firms, but decrease the number of permits demanded by financially secure firms.
Now let us determine how the initial allocation of permits and bankruptcy
risk affects the efficiency of a permit market in terms of its ability to distribute
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emissions control to minimize the expected aggregate abatement costs. The total
abatement costs of the industry can be expressed as

TC = n1[π 1 (e1m ) − π 1 (e1 )] + n2 [π 2 (e2m ) − π 2 (e2 )] ,

[1.11]

where recall that e1m and e2m are determined by π 1′(e) = 0 and π 2′ (e) = 0 . The cap on
aggregate emissions implies e1 ( p( L, l2 ) = ( L − n2 e2 ( p( L, l2 ), l2 ) ) n1 . Substitute this
into [1.11] and differentiate it with respect to l2 to obtain
⎛ ∂e ∂p ∂e2 ⎞
∂TC ∂l2 = n2 (π 1′ − π 2′ ) ⎜ 2
+
⎟.
⎝ ∂p ∂l2 ∂l2 ⎠

[1.12]

Recall that financially secure firms choose their emissions so that p = π 1′(e1 ) , but
firms that risk bankruptcy choose their emissions so that p > π 2′ (e2 ) . Therefore,

π 1′ − π 2′ > 0 in a market equilibrium. The last term of [1.12] contains the direct and
indirect effects of changing l2 on the emissions of type 2 firms, the combination of
which we have just shown to be negative (equation [1.10]). Therefore, ∂TC ∂l2 < 0
so that the aggregate abatement costs of holding the industry’s aggregate emissions to

L is decreasing in the initial allocation of permits to firms that risk bankruptcy.
Consequently, increased bankruptcy risk in an emissions trading program can increase
the expected aggregate abatement costs.
To be complete, let us briefly explain how these results change if the
aggregate permits demand function is increasing in the permit price in equilibrium. In
this case, a lower permit allocation to financially insecure firms, which means higher
bankruptcy risk, actually reduces the equilibrium permit price. Consequently,
financially secure firms increase their emissions while insecure firms decrease
emissions. Moreover, the sigh of ∂TC ∂l2 is reversed, indicating that decreasing the
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allocation of permits to financially insecure firms can reduce the expected aggregate
abatement costs of the industry. However, we should be aware that these results only
occur at the extreme case where the aggregate demand function of permits is upward
sloping.
1.5 Conclusion

Using our results and the monotonic relationship between bankruptcy risk
and the initial allocation of permits to financially insecure firms, we have generated
several policy-relevant conclusions about the impact of bankruptcy risk on the
performance of emissions trading markets. The presence of bankruptcy risk reduces
the allocative efficiency of competitive emissions trading markets, and makes the
distribution of individual control responsibility dependent on the initial allocation of
permits. Thus, the fundamental values of competitive emissions trading programs do
not hold when some firms in the market risk bankruptcy. Financial insecurity, like
market power and transaction costs, is yet another problem that can prevent emissions
markets from fulfilling their theoretical promises. Although we have focused the
analysis on emissions trading schemes, these results can be safely generated in other
property rights trading markets, such as ITQ.
One may be tempted to use our results to suggest that regulators can use the
initial distribution of permits to mitigate the inefficiency associated with bankruptcy
risk. But doing so would not be a trivial undertaking. There are difficulties associated
with asymmetric information. A regulator must know which firms are in financial
distress, which may not be readily available. Perhaps more importantly, firms would
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have the incentive to exaggerate their bankruptcy risk to obtain a greater allocation of
permits. In addition, financially secure firms would very likely object to allocating
more permits to insecure firms in the sense that allocating more permits to insecure
firms would basically be a subsidy for poorly performing firms. Hence, the regulator
has also to decide whether keeping financially distressed firms in the industry is
necessary. Finally, using the initial allocation to promote efficient permit markets
would have to overcome the tendency to allocate permits by some sort of
grandfathering rule.
While we have focused on the performance of tradable permit programs in
this paper, our results suggest that the inefficiency associated with bankruptcy risk
will also be present in other market-based policies, and may actually be worse. For
example, policies with auctioned permits can be viewed as tradable permit programs
without freely-given initial permit allocations. Since we’ve shown a negative
relationship between the initial allocation of permits and bankruptcy risk and its
associated market inefficiency, an auction, which allocates zero permits to all firms,
would seem to maximize the inefficiency associated with bankruptcy risk. An
emissions tax would produce the same result. There are good reasons to suspect that
auctioning permits or taxing emissions would often be more efficient than
freely-allocated permits, which include their ability to produce revenue that can offset
distortionary taxes in an economy, and because they may promote more rapid
technologic change. However, from the singular perspective of the inefficiency caused
by bankruptcy risk, the free allocation of permits to financially distressed firms may

19

be more efficient than other market-based policies that do not have this feature.
There are many other possible extensions of our model and results that are
likely to be valuable. Let us mention just a few. While we have focused on a static
model of permit trading, modeling bankruptcy risk in dynamic tradable permit
markets (that may or may not allow some form of permit banking) would force us to
examine the impact of financial insecurity on the efficiency of these markets over
time as well as across firms. We have also assumed a fixed number of firms under a
tradable property rights regulation. However, financial distress makes the endogeneity
of the number of firms in an industry and the associated impacts on permit market
efficiency an important area for future work. Finally, while we have assumed that
firms fully comply with their output permits, allowing for noncompliance would
likely yield interesting insights into the relationship between bankruptcy risk and
compliance choices, and how these market difficulties work together to impact the
performance of tradable permit programs. Empirical tests of our results would be at
least as important as any theoretical extension of our model. Does financial insecurity
actually reduce allocative efficiency in tradable permit markets? In the absence of
naturally occurring data, testing this hypothesis in a laboratory setting would be a
straightforward exercise, and would probably lead to further insights into the
relationship between the financial health of firms and the performance of tradable
permit markets.
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CHAPTER 2
BANKRUPTCY RISK AND IMPERFECTLY
ENFORCED EMISSIONS TAXES
2.1 Introduction

As a market-based pollution control policy, emissions taxes have attracted a
wide attention in both theoretical world and policy circles since the early 1970’s.
Under perfect competition a unit Pigouvian tax of emissions, which is equal to the
marginal social damage generated by a pollutant, is proved to produce a
Pareto-efficient allocation of resources. See Baumol and Oates (1975). Given the
difficulties in estimating damage costs a uniform tax chosen by the authority still
leads to a reduction in emissions at the least cost possible to the society in the sense
that it equates marginal abatement costs among polluters.
However, with limited resources the enforcement of emissions taxes is
imperfect and hence leaves firms with the motivation to evade. Harford (1978) was
the first effort to study the consequences of evadable pollution taxes. In his work, a
unit tax is applied to the reported emissions and penalties for pollution tax evasion are
imposed to prevent firms from reporting zero released emissions. It is shown that in
equilibrium firms’ marginal abatement costs are equal to the unit tax as long as the
expected punishment induces positive emissions report. This result implies that the
efficiency of emissions taxes carries over to the case with tax evasion. Moreover, the
actual level of emissions is independent of enforcement parameters: the penalty on tax
evasion and the probability of detection. Consequently, aggregate emissions are
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insensitive to the enforcement strategies of emissions taxes.
There also exists a sizable literature concerning the imperfect enforcement of
another market-based pollution control policy—emissions trading schemes. Malik
(1990) noted that as long as the probability of being audited is constant as in the case
of random audits, markets for pollution control still generate efficient distributions
even with noncompliance. And, actual emissions do not directly depend on the
enforcement policy in the case of competitive emissions trading. Using laboratory
experiments, Murphy and Stranlund (2006) confirm that the direct effect of
monitoring and penalties on emissions choices is zero. Stranlund and Dhanda (1999)
show that a firm’s level of permit violation, including whether to violate or not, is
independent of firm-level characteristics, such as prices of outputs and inputs,
production and abatement technologies, etc. This finding has important implications
for enforcing emissions trading programs because it suggests that there is no need for
regulators to target their enforcement efforts on firm-specific parameters. Murphy and
Stranlund (2007) largely support this result by experimental data.
Sandmo (2002) also focuses on the consequences of imperfect enforcement
on environmental policies. He explores whether the efficiency of emissions taxes with
imperfect enforcement continues to hold in different situations. It is shown that when
the probability of detection is endogenous and dependent on actual emissions and
reported emissions, tax evasion may destroy the appealing efficiency of emissions
taxes. In the case of risk aversion, even though the release of a pollutant reported by
noncompliant firms changes emissions taxes could still distribute individual control
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responsibility efficiently.
In this chapter we discuss another situation under which imperfect
compliance may jeopardize the efficiency property of emissions taxes—bankruptcy
risk. We examine the features of an imperfectly enforced emissions tax when some
regulated firms risk bankruptcy. With the continuing application of pollution taxes, it
is natural for regulators to confront situations involving financially distressed firms.
Thus, it is important to know how the financial status of regulated firms can impact
the performance of emissions taxes. As stated in the chapter 1, we are not the first to
show that financial health of firms affects regulations. Spiegel and Spulber (1994)
investigate the interactions between the investment and financial decisions of firms
and a regulator’s control of their output price. Damania (2000) explores the link
between pollution taxes and the financial and output decisions of firms in an
oligopolistic industry, but the consequences of noncompliance and the effects of
bankruptcy risk on emissions taxes is less of his concern. Damania and Bulte (2005)
relate the harvest decisions of firms in a fishery to their financial structure and
imperfectly enforced regulatory controls, but they focus on fixed harvest quotas.
We demonstrate that the desirable characteristics of an imperfectly enforced
emissions tax disappear when some regulated firms face the risk of bankruptcy. In this
case an emissions tax will fail to allocate individual emissions control efficiently.
Thus, the main reason for implementing emissions taxes does not hold when some
pollution sources risk bankruptcy. Moreover, firms that risk bankruptcy choose higher
emissions when they are noncompliant than when they are compliant. Consequently,
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imperfect enforcement has a negative environmental consequence when some firms
risk insolvency that is not present when all firms are financially secure. Finally,
financially insecure firms choose higher violations than financially secure firms. Thus,
the financial health of firms is an important element in the allocation of scarce
enforcement resources among firms. The key factor that produces these negative
results is the well-known limited liability effect of debt financing—financially
insecure firms ignore returns in bankrupt states because debt holders become the
residual claimants. Thus, they make their decisions by optimizing only over states in
which they are solvent.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In next section we lay out a
model of a firm that operates under an imperfectly enforced emissions tax and that
may risk bankruptcy. Because financial security is a special case of this model, we use
it in section 3 to review the performance of an emissions task when no firm risks
insolvency, particularly the allocative efficiency of emissions taxes, the independence
of individual and aggregate emissions on imperfect enforcement, and the
independence of firms’ violations on their exogenous characteristics. In section 4 we
demonstrate how each of these results is modified in the presence of financially
insecure firms. We conclude in section 5.
2.2 A Model of an Indebted Firm under an Imperfectly Enforced Emissions Tax

Throughout we consider an industry composed of heterogeneous, risk neutral
firms whose emissions are controlled by a uniform emissions tax. Enforcement of the
tax is imperfect in the sense that it is not sufficient to keep firms from attempting to
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evade a portion of their tax liabilities. Assume the manager of each firm is controlled
by shareholders, so the manager of each firm seeks to maximize the expected value of
the firm.
For a particular firm in the industry, given its optimal choices of inputs and
outputs, the gross profit of the firm (profit excluding its tax and penalty payments) is

π (e, β )(1 + z ) , where e is the firm’s emissions, β is an exogenous factor that
affects the firm’s gross profit, and z is a continuous random variable that is
independently, but not necessarily identically distributed among the firms in the
industry. Each firm’s gross profit function is strictly increasing and strictly concave in
the firm’s emissions. The random variable z captures the effects of uncertainty on
the firm’s gross profit, such as the effects of random shifts in the demand for its output
or in factor prices. The probability density function of z is g ( z ) with support
[ z , z ] . The expectation of z is zero so that the firm’s expected gross profit is simply

π (e, β ) . The value of z is revealed only after the firm has made its emissions and
compliance decisions.
Each firm’s reported emissions, r , are taxed at rate t . To check whether the
firms report their true emission, each of them is audited with a constant probability

α that is common knowledge between the regulator and the firm. An audit reveals a
firm’s actual emissions without errors. A firm is in violation if its actual emissions
exceed its reported emissions. Since we are concerned with the combined roles of
financial insecurity and noncompliance in this paper we limit our analysis to
situations in which a firm’s violation is positive. If an audit reveals that a firm is in
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violation, a penalty f (e − r ) is imposed. The penalty function is the same for all
firms, and it is positive, strictly increasing, and strictly convex for positive violations.
Like Brander and Lewis (1986), Damania (2000), Damania and Bulte (2005),
we focus the analysis on a single period in which the financial structure of the firm is
fixed. A firm’s financial structure is summarized by two variables. One is the firm’s
equity A , and the other is the firm’s debt obligation D . The firm reimburses
creditors from net profits. If the firm’s losses exceed its equity, it will declare
bankruptcy, shut down, and use its equity to partially pay off its debt. Apart from
losing its equity A , there are no other costs associated with declaring bankruptcy.
Given a realization of z , the payoff to the shareholders of the firm is

π (e, β )(1 + z ) − tr − f (e − r ) − D + A ,

[2.1]

if it is audited by the regulator, and the payoff is

π (e, β )(1 + z ) − tr − D + A ,

[2.2]

if the firm is not audited. From [2.1] and [2.2] we define two critical breakeven states
of the random variable z in which the firm is indifferent between staying in business
and ceasing production. If the firm is audited, the breakeven value of z , denoted as
z a , is determined by setting [2.1] equal to zero and solving for z , yielding

za =

tr + f (e − r ) + D − A
−1.
π (e, β )

[2.3]

The breakeven value of z when the firm is not audited is denoted z na , and
determined by setting [2.2] equal to zero and solving for z :
z na =

tr + D − A
−1.
π (e, β )

[2.4]
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Note that z na < z a when the firm is noncompliant (i.e., e − r > 0 ), and z na = z a
when the firm is compliant ( e = r ). If the realized value of z is greater than both z a
and z na the firm will be solvent whether it is audited or not, but if the realized value
of z is less than both z a and z na the firm will be insolvent regardless of
monitoring. If the firm is noncompliant and the realized value of z is between z a
and z na , then the firm remains solvent if it is not audited, but is bankrupt if it is
audited.
Note that

z

∫z

a

g ( z )dz and

z

∫z

na

g ( z )dz

are probabilities the firm stays in

business when it is audited and when it is not, respectively. Clearly, these probabilities
decrease with z a and z na . Thus, if z na ≤ z a ≤ z , then

∫

z

za

g ( z )dz = ∫

z

z na

g ( z )dz = 1 ,

indicating that the firm is financially secure in the sense that it does not risk
bankruptcy. However, at the other end of the range of z , if z ≤ z na ≤ z a , then
z

∫z

a

g ( z )dz = ∫

z

z na

g ( z )dz = 0 and the firm will definitely go bankrupt. In this case it

will not even bother to begin production. Despite this possibility, and the possibility
that a firm will certainly be insolvent if it is audited but may not be if it is not audited,
we simplify our analysis by assuming that the probabilities the firm is solvent are
strictly greater than zero. This requires z na ≤ z a < z .
We are now ready to specify the decision problem of the manager of a firm.
Recall that a manager is risk neutral and chooses his or her firm’s emissions and
emissions report to maximize the expected value of the firm. Assuming that the
manager chooses positive emissions report, and violation, his or her decision problem
is to choose e and r to maximize
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V =α

{∫

za

z

(− A) g ( z )dz + ∫

+ (1 − α )

{∫

z

za

z na

z

[π (e, β )(1 + z ) − tr − f (e − r ) − D ] g ( z )dz

(− A) g ( z )dz + ∫

z

z na

[π (e, β )(1 + z ) − tr − D ] g ( z )dz

}

}

[2.5]

.

The firm’s expected value function consists of two parts; the firm’s expected
value given that it is audited multiplied by the probability of an audit (the top line of
V ) plus the expected value of the firm given that it is not audited times the

probability that it is not audited (the bottom line of V ). It is important to note that
shareholder-controlled financially insecure firms consider the states of bankruptcy
when making decisions only because their equity is at stake. But the level of equity is
fixed. This is the essence of the limited liability effect, which has important
consequences for the choices of a firm that operates under an emissions tax.
To determine these choices we assume throughout that V is strictly concave
in e and r . Therefore, the following first-order conditions are both necessary and
sufficient to identify a firm’s optimal emissions and emissions report:
Ve = α

{∫

z

za

}
V = α {∫ [ f ′(e − r ) − t ] g ( z )dz − z g ( z ) ⎡⎣π (e, β )(1 + z ) − tr − f (e − r ) − D + A⎤⎦}
+ (1 − α ) {∫ (−t ) g ( z )dz − z g ( z ) ⎡⎣π (e, β )(1 + z ) − tr − D + A⎤⎦} = 0.
+ (1 − α )

{∫

z

z na

π e (e, β )(1 + z ) g ( z )dz − zena g ( z na ) ⎡⎣π (e, β )(1 + z na ) − tr − D + A⎤⎦ = 0;

z

r

}

[π e (e, β )(1 + z ) − f ′(e − r )] g ( z )dz − zea g ( z a ) ⎡⎣π (e, β )(1 + z a ) − tr − f (e − r ) − D + A⎤⎦

a
r

za

z

z na

na
r

a

a

na

na

Recall that z a and z na are determined from

π (e, β )(1 + z a ) − tr − f (e − r ) − D + A = 0 and π (e, β )(1 + z na ) − tr − D + A = 0 ,
respectively. Using these relationships to simplify Ve = 0 and Vr = 0 yields:
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z
z
Ve = π e (e, β ) ⎡α ∫ a (1 + z ) g ( z )dz + (1 − α ) ∫ na (1 + z ) g ( z )dz ⎤
z
⎢⎣ z
⎥⎦
z

[2.6]

−α f ′(e − r ) ∫ a g ( z )dz = 0
z

z
z
z
Vr = α f ′(e − r ) ∫ a g ( z )dz − t ⎡α ∫ a g ( z )dz + (1 − α ) ∫ na g ( z )dz ⎤ = 0 .
⎢⎣ z
⎥⎦
z
z

[2.7]

Now combine equations [2.6] and [2.7] to obtain
z

z

[π e (e, β ) − t ] ⎡⎢⎣α ∫z a g ( z )dz + (1 − α )∫z na g ( z )dz ⎦⎤⎥
z
z
+ π e (e, β ) ⎡α ∫ a zg ( z )dz + (1 − α ) ∫ na zg ( z )dz ⎤ = 0.
z
⎣⎢ z
⎦⎥

[2.8]

Our analysis of the effects of bankruptcy risk on imperfectly enforced emissions taxes
is based on equations [2.7] and [2.8].
2.3 Imperfectly Enforced Emissions Taxes When Firms Are Financially Secure

In this section we use our model to review some fundamental conclusions
about imperfectly enforced emissions taxes when firms do not risk bankruptcy. There
are no new results in this section—some have been shown directly by Harford (1978
and 1987) and Sandmo (2002), in particular, while others can be gleaned from the
works of Malik (1990) and Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) who focused on emissions
trading. These results have to do with the allocative efficiency of an imperfectly
enforced tax, that individual and aggregate emissions do not depend on whether a tax
is enforced perfectly or not, and the independence of violations on firm-level
characteristics. We present all of the results in a single proposition.

Proposition 1: If no firm that operates under an emissions tax risks bankruptcy, then:

(1) The allocation of individual emissions control is efficient despite imperfect
enforcement.
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(2) Each firm’s choice of emissions is independent of their compliance decision.
(3) Aggregate emissions are unaffected by imperfect enforcement.
(4) Individual firm’s violations are independent of its exogenous characteristics.

Proof of Proposition 1: If a firm does not risk bankruptcy then z na ≤ z a ≤ z , which

implies

z

∫z

a

g ( z )dz = ∫

z

z

na

g ( z )dz = 1 and

z

∫z

a

zg ( z )dz = ∫

z

z na

zg ( z )dz = 0.

The latter relationships are due to our assumption that the expectation of z is equal
to zero. Now substitute these into equations [2.7] and [2.8] to obtain t = α f ′(e − r )
and π e (e, β ) = t , respectively. Allocative efficiency requires that the industry’s
expected gross profit be maximized given the level of aggregate emissions that is
induced by the emissions tax7. As is well-known the necessary conditions for this
maximization problem imply that the firms’ marginal expected gross profits are equal.
This is achieved because π e (e, β ) = t for every firm, each firm faces the same
emissions tax, and hence, π e (e, β ) is equal for every firm. This proves part (1) of the
proposition. To prove part (2) note that a firm’s choice of emissions is e(t , β ) , the
implicit solution to π e (e, β ) = t . Since this decision does not depend on monitoring
or penalties, it is independent of the firm’s compliance decision. Part (3) follows
directly from part (2): if individual firms’ emissions are unaffected by imperfect
enforcement, aggregate emissions are unaffected as well. To prove part (4), write the
firm’s optimal emissions report as r ( β ) . (Writing the firm’s report in this way is not
meant to suggest that it only depends on β — it also depends on the emissions tax,
7

This is fully equivalent to minimizing the aggregate abatement costs of holding an industry
to a specific level of aggregate emissions.
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monitoring, and the penalty function). Given the firm’s optimal choice of emissions,
e(t , β ) , and t = α f ′(e − r) we have t − α f ′(e(t , β ) − r ( β )) ≡ 0 . Differentiate this

with respect to β to obtain −α f ′′(⋅)(eβ − rβ ) = 0, which implies that the marginal
effect on the firm’s violation of a change in β is eβ − rβ = 0, which indicates that
the firm’s choice of violation is independent of β . Thus, the individual violations of
financially secure firms are independent of their exogenous differences, suggesting
that a regulator finds no value in targeting its enforcement effort. The proof is
complete. QED.

Before we move to examining how these results change when at least some
firms in an industry risk bankruptcy, it is worthwhile to be clear about how the results
depend on two assumptions we maintain throughout this paper. The first is that each
firm submits a positive emissions report. It is straightforward to show that a
financially secure firm that reports zero emissions chooses its actual emissions so that

t ≥ π e (e, β ). If this inequality is strict for some firms, then the expected marginal
gross profits of the firms will not be equalized and aggregate expected gross profits
will not be maximized. The possibility that a tax regulation will be so poorly enforced
that some firms report zero emissions seems rather remote. One may also wonder
whether a real firm would ever reports zero emissions, given that this would send such
an obvious signal of noncompliance to the regulator.
The other assumption that is necessary for Proposition 1 is that the
probability a firm will be monitored does not depend on its emissions or emissions
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report. Actually, all that is needed for Proposition 1 to hold is that firms are not
monitored with probability α (e, r ) such that α e ≠ −α r (Harford 1978 and 1987,
Sandmo 2002). Under such a monitoring probability firms will choose their emissions
so that their expected marginal gross profits differ from the tax. This will cause
expected aggregate gross profit to be less than maximum. For this reason, we do not
examine such a monitoring strategy in this paper.
2.4 Imperfectly Enforced Emissions Taxes When Firms Are Financially Insecure

In this section we demonstrate how each of the results in Proposition 1 is
modified in the presence of financially insecure firms. We begin with the allocative
efficiency of an emission tax when some firms in an industry risk bankruptcy.

Proposition 2: If some firms under an emissions tax risk bankruptcy the distribution

of individual emissions control will not be efficient.

Proof of Proposition 2: Rearrange equation [2.8] to obtain
z

z

− [π e (e, β ) − t ] α ∫z a zg ( z )dz + (1 − α ) ∫z na zg ( z )dz
.
=
z
z
π e (e, β )
α g ( z )dz + (1 − α )
g ( z )dz

∫z

∫z

a

na

On the right hand side of [2.9], the denominator is positive because
and ∫

z

z na

[2.9]
z

∫z

a

g ( z )dz > 0

g ( z )dz > 0 . The numerator is also positive. To understand why, recall that the

expectation of z is zero so that

z

∫z zg ( z)dz = 0 . Since the firm risks bankruptcy, at

least when it is audited, z < z a , implying

z

∫z

solvent when it is not audited, z na ≤ z and

32

a

zg ( z )dz > 0 . If the firm is definitely
z

∫z

na

zg ( z )dz = 0 . If the firm risks

insolvency when it is not audited, z < z na and
z

∫z

a

zg ( z )dz > 0 and

z

∫z

na

z

∫z

na

zg ( z )dz > 0 . Since

zg ( z )dz ≥ 0 the numerator of the right side of [2.9] is

strictly positive, implying further that the entire right side of [2.9] is positive.
Given that the right side of [2.9] is positive, the equality holds if and only if
the left side is positive as well. Note that this will be true if and only if π e (e, β ) > 0
and π e (e, β ) < t . Recall that allocative efficiency requires that each firm choose its
emissions so that its expected marginal gross profit is equal to the tax. Since
financially insecure firms choose their emissions so that π e (e, β ) < t while those that
are financially secure choose their emissions so that π e (e, β ) = t , the distribution of
emissions in an industry that contains financially insecure firms will not be efficient.
QED.

Note that not only will the expected marginal gross profits of firms that risk
bankruptcy differ from those of firms that are financially secure, expected marginal
gross profits among financially distressed firms will likely differ because the values of

z a and z na vary among these firms, and the densities g ( z ) may vary as well.
Since the emissions tax will not equate the firms’ expected marginal gross profits,
expected industry gross profit will not be maximized. Thus, the main reason for
implementing emissions taxes does not hold in situations involving financially
insecure firms.
The result that firms that risk bankruptcy choose their emissions so that their
expected marginal gross profits are less than the tax implies that they choose higher
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emissions than if they were financially secure. This is due to the limited liability
effect—since firms that risk bankruptcy do not consider bankrupt states in their
decisions they optimize over only those states in which they will be solvent.
Optimization over a restricted range of the random variable z causes them to choose
higher emissions.
It is important to note that this result of allocative inefficiency holds whether
financially insecure firms are also noncompliant or not. We have shown in Chapter 1
that emissions trading programs with perfect enforcement are inefficient in the
existence of financially distressed firms. With the next proposition we show that
imperfect enforcement causes financially insecure firms to choose even higher levels
of emissions.

Proposition 3: A firm that risks bankruptcy will choose higher emissions if an

emissions tax is imperfectly enforced than if it is perfectly enforced.

Proof of Proposition 3: When an emissions tax is perfectly enforced, a firm chooses

its emissions to equal its reported emissions ( e = r ). From [2.3] and [2.4], compliance
implies z a = z na . Under this condition the firm’s expected value function [2.5]
simplifies to

(

a

V e, z = z

na

z na

) = ∫z

(− A) g ( z )dz + ∫

z

z na

[π (e, β )(1 + z ) − te − D ] g ( z )dz ,

and its optimal choice of emissions satisfies

(

)

Ve e, z a = z na = [π e (e, β ) − t ] ∫

z

z na

g ( z )dz + π e (e, β ) ∫
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z

z na

zg ( z )dz = 0 . [2.10]

Suppose on the other hand that the emissions tax is imperfectly enforced so that the
firm is noncompliant. Suppose further that when the firm is noncompliant it chooses
emissions e to satisfy equation [2.8]. The proof of the proposition is based on

(

evaluating the sign of Ve e, z a = z na

(

V e, z a = z na

)

)

at e and using the strict concavity of

in e to show that the firm’s choice of emissions when it is compliant

is less than e .

(

Using [2.10], Ve e, z a = z na

(

)

evaluated at e is

)

z
z
Ve e , z a = z na = [π e (e , β ) − t ] ⎡ ∫ na g ( z )dz ⎤ + π e (e , β ) ⎡ ∫ na zg ( z )dz ⎤ . [2.11]
⎢⎣ z ( e )
⎥⎦
⎢⎣ z ( e )
⎥⎦

That e satisfies equation [2.8] allows us to write it as the identity
z

z

[π e (e , β ) − t ] ⎡⎢⎣α ∫za (e ) g ( z )dz + (1 − α )∫z na (e ) g ( z )dz ⎦⎤⎥
z
z
+ π e (e , β ) ⎡α ∫ a zg ( z )dz + (1 − α ) ∫ na zg ( z )dz ⎤ ≡ 0.
z (e )
⎣⎢ z ( e )
⎦⎥

[2.12]

Use [2.12] to substitute for π e (e , β ) − t in [2.11] and rearrange terms to show that

(

Ve e , z a = z na
= π e (e , β )

)

α ⎡∫
⎢⎣

z

z na ( e )

zg ( z ) dz ∫

z

za (e )

α∫

z

za (e )

g ( z ) dz − ∫

z

z na ( e )

g ( z )dz + (1 − α ) ∫

g ( z )dz ∫

z

z na ( e )

z

za (e )

zg ( z )dz ⎤
⎥⎦
.

[2.13]

g ( z )dz

From the proof of Proposition 2, π e (e , β ) > 0 . The denominator of [2.13] is also

(

positive, so the sign of Ve e , z a = z na

)

is equal to the sign of the term in hard

brackets. Rearrange this term to show that it has the same sign as
z

z

∫z (e ) zg ( z )dz − ∫z (e ) zg ( z )dz .
z
z
∫z (e ) g ( z )dz ∫z (e ) g ( z )dz
na

na

a

[2.14]

a

The first term of this difference is the conditional expectation of z given

z ∈ [ z na (e ), z ] , while the second is conditional expectation of z given
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z ∈ [ z a (e ), z ] . Since z na (e ) < z a (e ) because the firm is noncompliant at e , the first
term is less than the second and [2.14] is negative. Since [2.14] has the same sign as

(

)

(

)

Ve e , z a = z na , Ve e , z a = z na < 0.
The firm’s optimal choice of emissions given that it is compliant is the

(

)

(

)

(

solution to Ve e, z a = z na = 0. Since Ve e, z a = z na

)

is monotonically decreasing

in e and Ve e , z a = z na < 0 , the firm’s choice of emissions when it is compliant is
less than if it was noncompliant. Thus, imperfect enforcement causes a firm that risks
bankruptcy to choose higher emissions. QED.

Since imperfect enforcement causes financially insecure firms to choose
higher emissions than if the tax was enforced so that the firms were compliant, the
following proposition follows immediately.

Proposition 4: Imperfect enforcement of an emissions tax leads to higher aggregate

emissions when some firms under the risk of bankruptcy.

Recall from Proposition 1 that, under reasonable circumstances, imperfect
enforcement has no effect on the emissions of financially secure firms. Thus, a
regulator does not need to be concerned about the environmental impacts of imperfect
enforcement. However, Proposition 4 reveals that this result does not hold when an
emissions tax is applied to firms that risk insolvency—imperfect enforcement
weakens the ability of an emissions tax to improve environmental outcomes when it is
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applied in a situation involving financially insecure firms.
Bankruptcy risk and imperfect enforcement also makes the allocation of
enforcement effort more complicated. Part (4) of Proposition 1 reveals that differences
in the violations of financially secure firms are independent of differences in their
exogenous characteristics. Thus, a regulator does not need to gather information about
individual firms to target its enforcement effort—only the tax and the enforcement
parameters, all of which are known by the regulator, determine a firm’s violations.
This is no longer true when some firms risk insolvency. In particular, the violations of
financially insecure firms will differ from the violations of financially secure firms.

Proposition 5: Noncompliant firms that risk bankruptcy choose higher violations than

if they were financially secure.

z
z
Proof of Proposition 5: Define M = ⎡α ∫ a g ( z )dz + (1 − α ) ∫ na g ( z )dz ⎤
⎢⎣ z
⎥⎦
z

z

∫z

a

g ( z )dz .

Use M to rewrite [2.7] as α f ′(e − r ) = tM . If the firm does not risk bankruptcy,

z na < z a ≤ z , which implies

z

∫z

a

g ( z )dz = ∫

z

z na

g ( z )dz = 1 and M = 1 . Thus, as we

showed in the proof of Proposition 1, a noncompliant financially secure firm chooses
its violation so that α f ′(e − r ) = t.
On the other hand, if a noncompliant firm risks bankruptcy,
z

∫z

a

z

∫z

a

g ( z )dz < ∫

z

z na

g ( z )dz and

g ( z )dz . Since the numerator of M is a linear combination of
z

∫z

na

g ( z )dz , the fact that the former is less than the latter implies

z

z

z

z

z

z

α ∫ a g ( z )dz + (1 − α ) ∫ na g ( z )dz > ∫ a g ( z )dz and M > 1 . Therefore, a noncompliant
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financially insecure firm chooses its violation so that α f ′(e − r ) > t. Since f (e − r )
is strictly convex, this implies that a noncompliant firm that risks bankruptcy chooses
a higher violation than if it did not risk bankruptcy. QED

Armed with Proposition 5, a regulator who is motivated to use its scarce
enforcement resources to detect and punish firms that tend toward higher violations
may wish to target its enforcement effort at financially insecure firms. Doing so, of
course, requires the regulator to gather information on the financial health of all firms.
At best, gathering this information will add to the cost of enforcing an emissions tax.
Moreover, the higher aggregate violations that are produced by bankruptcy risk and
imperfect enforcement may lead to higher costs of sanctioning noncompliant firms.
Thus, it may very well be the case that bankruptcy risk places more pressure on scarce
enforcement resources.
Note that we have not addressed the point of part (4) of Proposition 1 directly.
There we showed the independence of parametric differences in firms’ profit
functions on differences in their violations. Proposition 5 focuses on the role that
differences in the financial health of firms have on differences in their violations. The
comparative static relating a parametric change in a financially insecure firm’s profit
to its violation choice is a very complicated function that has an indeterminate sign.
(The derivation of this comparative static is available upon request). Thus, the
violations of firms that risk bankruptcy are not, in general, independent of parametric
differences in their gross profit functions; in fact, a parametric increase in a firm’s
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profit function can cause it to choose higher or lower violations. Moreover, the
comparative static depends on all the parameters of the firm’s decision problem,
including those involving the enforcement strategy it faces, its financial structure, and
the uncertainty about its ultimate profit. Since most of these factors involve
information that is likely to be hidden, a regulator will have a very hard time targeting
its enforcement effort based on information that determines a firm’s profit function.
2.5 Conclusions

We have examined the combined roles of bankruptcy risk and imperfect
enforcement on the performance of an emissions tax. In the absence of bankruptcy
risk in a population of regulated firms, emissions taxes retain their beneficial
characteristics even when they are not enforced perfectly. Under favorable, but not
unrealistic conditions, an imperfectly enforced emissions tax produces an efficient
allocation of individual emissions control; the aggregate level of control is the same as
under a perfectly enforced tax, and differences in individual violations are
independent of firm-level differences. All of these characteristics disappear when
some firms under an emissions tax risk bankruptcy—the allocation of emissions
control is inefficient, imperfect enforcement causes higher aggregate emissions, and
financially insecure firms choose higher violations. Thus, the combined effects of
bankruptcy risk and imperfect enforcement produce higher expected aggregate costs
of emissions control (or rather, lower aggregate expected gross profits), worse
environmental quality, and more pressure on scarce enforcement resources.
Regulatory options to limit these losses are probably limited to options that
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reduce the risks of bankruptcy among financially insecure firms. One option, which
was explored by Damania and Bulte (2006) is to provide direct subsidies to distressed
firms. This option is fraught with difficulties, including the political difficulty of
subsidizing polluting firms, and the moral hazard problem that would surely result
because firms would have an incentive to exaggerate their risk of bankruptcy to obtain
the subsidy. A more reasonable option might be to allow firms to pollute up to a
certain level for free before the tax kicks in. This would reduce firms’ tax payments
thereby reducing the bankruptcy risk of financially insecure firms, and likely lead to
more efficient outcomes. In Chapter 1 we noted that providing a greater number of
free tradable emissions permits to insecure firms improved their financial health and
led to a more efficient distribution of individual emissions choices.
It may also be possible to use tax rates and enforcement stringency to achieve
more efficient outcomes. However, determining how this can be done requires
determining the comparative statics of how changes in the tax, monitoring, and
penalties affect firms’ choices of emissions and violations, and these comparative
statics in our model always have indeterminate signs. As others in this literature have
found, changing regulatory controls and their enforcement can lead to seemingly
paradoxical results; for example, higher emissions taxes can cause financially
distressed firms to increase their emissions, and reducing enforcement stringency can
promote greater compliance. We should also note that these results depend on the
private information of firms, including information about their profit functions and
their financial health. This, even though one can imagine that regulators could
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minimize the inefficiencies associated with bankruptcy risk with judicious choices of
tax rates and enforcement strategies, the information requirements of doing so are
quite severe.
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APPENDIX: CONDITIONAL EXPECTATION

Here we prove that

z

z

∫zˆ zg ( z)dz ∫zˆ g ( z )dz

is the expectation of z

conditional on the firm being solvent. The expectation of z conditional on the firm
z

being solvent can be expressed as E ( z | z > zˆ ) = ∫ z[ g ( z ) | z > zˆ ]dz , where
zˆ

g ( z ) | z > zˆ is the conditional probability density function of z —the density

function of z given z > zˆ . We derive this conditional density function by obtaining
the conditional cumulative density function of z , G ( z ) | z > zˆ .
G ( z ) | z > zˆ = P ( z ≤ m | z > zˆ ) =

P ( zˆ < z ≤ m) P ( z ≤ m) − P ( z ≤ zˆ )
=
P ( z > zˆ )
P ( z > zˆ )

[A.1]

In [A.1], m is a random point chosen in ( zˆ, z ] . We get the conditional probability
density function of z by differentiating [A.1] with respect to m . Note that
P ( z ≤ m) is exactly the cumulative density function of z , i.e., G ( z ) , whose

derivative with respect to m is g ( z ) . Thus, g ( z ) | z > zˆ =

g ( z)

∫

z

zˆ

z

z

E ( z | z > zˆ) = ∫ z[ g ( z ) | z > zˆ ]dz =
zˆ

∫ zg ( z )dz .
∫ g ( z )dz
zˆ

z

zˆ
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g ( z )dz

and
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